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Note 
 
Murder and the Military Commissions: 
Prohibiting the Executive’s Unauthorized 
Expansion of Jurisdiction 
Joseph C. Hansen∗ 
A building crumbled on July 27, 2002, in Afghanistan.1 As 
the combat support aircraft roared away, a United States 
ground assault team entered the rubble to “clear the target.”2 
The soldiers tossed grenades while examining the ruins3 when 
suddenly a grenade not thrown by the U.S. forces exploded 
nearby, killing Sergeant First Class Christopher Speer.4 The 
soldiers, spotting a wounded fighter who had apparently 
thrown the grenade, opened fire and shot him several times in 
the chest.5 That fighter, fifteen-year old Omar Khadr, a Cana-
dian citizen, survived.6 
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Elizabeth Borer and Charlie Dickinson, for ideas, feedback, and superb edit-
ing. Finally, he would like to express his gratitude to his parents for their 
support and to his darling wife Paola for her patience and encouragement. 
Copyright © 2009 by Joseph C. Hansen. 
 1. Defense Motion to Dismiss Charge I for Failure to State an Element of 
the Offenses in Violation of Due Process 2, United States v. Khadr, D071 (Ct. 
Mil. Comm’n Rev. July 11, 2008), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
news/commissionsKhadr.html (follow “Motion to Dismiss Charge I Due 
Process” hyperlink, posted Aug. 26, 2008). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Jeff Tietz, The Unending Torture of Omar Khadr, ROLLING STONE, 
Aug. 10, 2006, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/11128331. But see 
Jane Sutton, Canadian’s Battle Role Cast in Doubt at Guantanamo, REUTERS, 
Dec. 13, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/asiaCrisis/idUSN12458385 (re-
laying that SFC Speer may have been killed by friendly fire). 
 5. See Tietz, supra note 4 (describing Khadr’s shooting); see also Sutton, 
supra note 4 (citing emerging evidence that Khadr was buried beneath rubble 
and could not have thrown the grenade). 
 6. See Clifford Krauss, Canadian Teenager Held by U.S. in Afghanistan 
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After nearly five years of detention in Afghanistan and 
Guantánamo Bay, the U.S. government charged Omar Khadr 
with, among other things, Murder in Violation of the Law of 
War.7 Almost two years of pretrial wrangling in the Guantá-
namo military commissions followed, but it is now unclear 
when or where Khadr will be tried.8 Nonetheless, the pretrial 
exchanges illustrated the problematic nature of the charges re-
lated to Murder in Violation of the Law of War: as the Guantá-
namo defense team protested, killing only violates the law of 
war when it is committed against protected persons who take 
no active part in the hostilities.9 Omar Khadr, accused of 
throwing a hand grenade at an active soldier, committed no 
such offense. The military judge, however, denied the defense’s 
motion to dismiss, concluding that the killing of an active com-
batant by an “unlawful combatant” violated the law of war.10 
This assertion, which directly conflicts with the established 
law of war, could only have been reached by relying on lan-
guage promulgated by the Secretary of Defense in the Manual 
for Military Commissions (MMC).11 The MMC purports to 
comply with Congress’s mandate in the Military Commissions 
Act of 2006 (MCA) to define elements of crimes consistently 
 
in Killing of American Medic, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2002, at A8 (providing 
background about Khadr). 
 7. Referred Charges 4, United States v. Khadr (Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. 
Apr. 24, 2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2007/ 
Khadrreferral.pdf. 
 8. The trial date had been set for January 26, 2009, but President Ob-
ama promptly postponed all military commission trials and announced plans 
to close the Guantánamo detention facility. See Mark Mazzetti & William Gla-
berson, Obama to Close Foreign Prisons and Guantanamo Bay, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 22, 2009, at A1. 
 9. See Defense Motion to Dismiss Charge One for Failure to State an Of-
fense and for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 1, United States v. Khadr, 
D008 (Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. Dec. 7, 2007), available at http://www.defenselink 
.mil/news/commissionsKhadr.html (follow “Motions Sessions (Pleadings Filed 
by Counsel—Law Motions/Dec 2007)” hyperlink). 
 10. See Government’s Response to the Defense’s Motion to Dismiss 
Charge I for Failure to State an Element of the Offense in Violation of Due 
Process 1–2, United States v. Khadr, D071 (Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. July 25, 
2008), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/commissionsKhadr.html 
(follow “Motion to Dismiss Charge I Due Process” hyperlink, posted Aug. 26, 
2008; Government’s Response attached at the end of the Defense’s Motion) (re-
ferring to the Commission’s prior ruling on an earlier motion to dismiss in 
Khadr’s case). 
 11. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS, at IV-
11 to -12 (2007) [hereinafter MMC], available at http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
news/commissionsmanual.html (follow “Manual for Military Commissions” 
hyperlink, posted Jan. 18, 2007). 
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with the MCA,12 but instead impermissibly redefines the of-
fense of Murder in Violation of the Law of War by focusing on 
the status of the accused rather than the victim. 
The MMC’s definition of when the law of war may be vi-
olated raises a number of troubling legal issues, from the con-
flation of independent elements of a crime to executive action 
devoid of statutory or constitutional authority. Although Con-
gress entrusted the Secretary of Defense with the responsibility 
of defining the individual elements of the crimes,13 Congress 
did not—and could not—delegate its constitutional authority to 
define offenses against the law of nations.14 
This Note argues that the Secretary of Defense acted con-
trary to the MCA’s explicit mandate and unconstitutionally ar-
rogated Congress’s legislative powers by redefining the crime of 
Murder in Violation of the Law of War. Part I outlines when 
murder violates the law of war by reviewing the MCA, the es-
tablished law of war, and the MMC’s novel definition. Part II 
examines the deficiencies in the MMC’s definition and analyzes 
the lack of statutory and constitutional authority for the Secre-
tary of Defense’s redefinition. Part III contends that judges 
should apply the longstanding law of war and that the Obama 
Administration should ensure that future law-of-war prosecu-
tions are constitutionally sound. This Note proposes that in 
prosecutions for Murder in Violation of the Law of War, judges 
should disregard the MMC’s definition and apply the law as 
Congress intended: to commit Murder in Violation of the Law of 
War, one must violate the law of war. Further, the new admin-
istration should avoid executive interpretations of the law of 
war that violate the constitutional separation of powers, con-
travene the law of war, and facilitate potentially lethal criminal 
liability. 
 
 12. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 
(codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 13. See 10 U.S.C. § 949a(a) (2006) (“[E]lements and modes of proof, for 
cases triable by military commission under this chapter may be prescribed by 
the Secretary of Defense . . . .”).  
 14. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 10; Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942) 
(stating it is Congress’s constitutional power to “defin[e] and punish[ ] offenses 
against the law of nations, including those which pertain to the conduct of 
war”); see also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996) (“Congress 
may not delegate the power to make laws and so may delegate no more than 
the authority to make policies and rules that implement its statutes.”); United 
States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) (“[T]he plain principle 
[is] that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative [branch] . . . .”). 
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I.  MURDER IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF WAR   
In the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which authorized 
trial by military commission for violations of the law of war, 
Congress defined the substantive offense of Murder in Violation 
of the Law of War.15 While the Act does not define the “law of 
war,” widely established norms dictate that murder only vi-
olates the law of war when committed against persons taking 
no active part in the hostilities. Nonetheless, the Secretary of 
Defense, given the authority to outline individual elements of 
the crimes in the military commissions,16 redefined when mur-
der violates the law of war by focusing on the status of the of-
fender rather than the victim.17 
A.  THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006 
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that the 
military commission convened by the President to try Guantá-
namo detainees was not a “regularly constituted court” re-
quired by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions18 with 
which the Executive must comply.19 The Court suggested that 
congressional authorization could remedy the commissions’ de-
ficiencies.20 Congress responded by passing the Military Com-
missions Act of 2006,21 which created a military commission 
system to try detainees held in Guantánamo Bay.22 
 
 15. 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(15). 
 16. See id. § 949a(a). 
 17. See MMC, supra note 11, at IV-11 to -12. 
 18. The “Geneva Conventions” references four individual conventions: 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 
31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Ameliora-
tion of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Gene-
va Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva 
Convention III]; and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [herei-
nafter Geneva Convention IV]. 
 19. 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2798 (2006), superseded by statute, Military Commis-
sions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered 
sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), as recognized in Boumediene v. Bush, 
128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241–42 (2008). 
 20. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775–76; id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(“Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the au-
thority he believes necessary.”). 
 21. Military Commissions Act. 
 22. 10 U.S.C. § 948b(a) (2006). 
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The Supreme Court has long recognized that military 
commission jurisdiction is limited to violations of the law of 
war.23 The MCA recognizes this limited jurisdiction by only 
granting jurisdiction “to try any offense made punishable by 
[the MCA] or the law of war.”24 According to Congress, the 
MCA codifies offenses traditionally triable by military commis-
sions and does not establish new crimes.25 One of the twenty-
eight substantive offenses listed in the MCA is Murder in Vi-
olation of the Law of War, defined as the intentional killing of 
“one or more persons, including lawful combatants, in violation 
of the law of war.”26 
The MCA grants the Secretary of Defense the authority to 
prescribe procedures and rules of evidence for the military 
commissions, as long as they are neither contrary to nor incon-
sistent with the MCA.27 On January 18, 2007, the Secretary of 
Defense published the Manual for Military Commissions.28 For 
each crime listed in the MCA, the MMC enumerates individual 
elements, lists maximum punishments, and provides explana-
tory comments.29 
B.  UNIVERSAL NORMS FOR WHEN MURDER VIOLATES THE LAW 
OF WAR 
Defendants accused of murder are not normally tried in a 
military commission. Because the MCA declares that it creates 
no new offenses, the predicate jurisdictional hook for the mili-
tary commissions is that an alleged murder must somehow vi-
olate the law of war.30 The law of war is defined by looking to 
universal agreement and practice both in this country and 
 
 23. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2777 (stating a law-of-war commission has 
jurisdiction to try two kinds of offenses: “violations of the laws of war cogniza-
ble by military tribunals” and certain “breaches of military orders”) (citing 
WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 839 (2d ed. 1920)); In re 
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 13 (1946) (asserting that to be tried in a military com-
mission, the charge must be a violation of the law of war); Ex parte Quirin, 317 
U.S. 1, 29 (1942) (discussing commissions’ authority to try “offenses against 
the law of war”). 
 24. 10 U.S.C. § 948d(a). 
 25. Id. § 950p. 
 26. Id. § 950v(b)(15). 
 27. Id. § 949a(a). 
 28. MMC, supra note 11. 
 29. See id. at IV-1 to -22. 
 30. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29 (1942) (“We must therefore first 
inquire whether any of the acts charged is an offense against the law of war 
cognizable before a military tribunal.”). 
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worldwide.31 U.S. military law, U.S. federal law, and customary 
international law are in unanimous agreement: murder, or will-
ful killing, constitutes a violation of the law of war only when 
committed against protected persons, who broadly include all 
who do not take an active part in the hostilities.32 
According to the U.S. military, murder violates the law of 
war only when committed against a protected person.33 The 
U.S. military defines a violation of the law of war as a war 
crime.34 “Willful killing,” or murder, constitutes a war crime 
when committed against persons protected by the Geneva Con-
 
 31. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2780 (2006), superseded by 
statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 
(codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), as recognized in 
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241–42 (2008); Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30 
(explaining that Congress chose to adopt the common law system of the law of 
war applied by military tribunals to the extent courts deem applicable); see 
also L.C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 52–53 (2d ed. 
2000) (“[T]he law of armed conflict is still governed by . . . international cus-
tomary law . . . .”). 
 32. Two distinctions must be made. First, killing through perfidy—the 
treacherous killing of another, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1173 (8th ed. 2004)—
is a separate violation of the law of war. See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 31, at 
145–47. Second, killing using a prohibited weapon is another way to violate 
the law of war. See, e.g., Bill Boothby, The Law of Weaponry—Is It Adequate?, 
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 297, 298 (Michael Schmitt & 
Jelena Pejic eds., 2007) (explaining the fundamental principles of the law of 
weaponry). The actual war crime, however, is employing a prohibited weapon, 
which is an independent crime from Murder in Violation of the Law of War. 
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(xvii)–(xx), 
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 96. The U.S. military, largely in line with the 
international community, prohibits use of the following weapons: weapons cal-
culated to cause unnecessary suffering, weapons that have an indiscriminate 
effect, poison, gases, and chemical or bacteriological warfare. See JUDGE AD-
VOCATE GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 18–20 
(2007), [hereinafter OPLAW HANDBOOK], available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA469294&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf; U.S. DEP’T 
OF THE AIR FORCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW—THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT 
AND AIR OPERATIONS: AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 110-31 §§ 6-3(b)–(c), 6-4 (1976) 
[hereinafter AFP 110-31] (rescinded in 2006 and not yet replaced); U.S. DEP’T 
OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE: FIELD MANUAL 27-10 app. A-10 to 
-11 (1956) (as modified by Change No. 1, July 15, 1976), [hereinafter FM 27-
10], available at http://www.afsc.army.mil/gc/files/FM27-10.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE NAVY, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERA-
TIONS, NWP 1-14M §§ 9.1.1, 9.1.2, 10.3, 10.4 (2007), [hereinafter NAVAL 
HANDBOOK], available at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/cnws/ild/documents/1-14M_ 
(Jul_2007)_(NWP).pdf. Hand grenades are not prohibited. See FM 27-10, su-
pra, app. A-11; NAVAL HANDBOOK, supra, § 9.5. 
 33. See OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 32, at 16–17; FM 27-10, supra note 
32, app. A-118; NAVAL HANDBOOK, supra note 32, § 6.2.6. 
 34. FM 27-10, supra note 32, app. A-117; NAVAL HANDBOOK, supra note 
32, § 6.2.6.  
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ventions.35 Protected persons include civilians taking no active 
part in the hostilities, enemies hors de combat,36 and survivors 
of ships and aircraft lost at sea.37 Besides the war crime of kill-
ing those protected by the Geneva Conventions, the only other 
listed war crimes involving murder are summary executions of 
persons in custody and bombardment with the deliberate pur-
pose of killing protected civilians.38 Both of these crimes are 
still murder of protected persons—soldiers hors de combat and 
civilians taking no active part in the hostilities.39 
Congress made war crimes a federal offense in 1996.40 In 
2006, in response to Hamdan and concerns that U.S. personnel 
could be prosecuted for war crimes, Congress narrowed the de-
finition of a war crime through the MCA to include only a 
“grave breach” of the Geneva Conventions (previously any 
breach of the Geneva Conventions constituted a war crime).41 
The statute further defines murder as a grave breach when 
committed against one or more persons taking no active part in 
the hostilities, including those no longer able to participate in 
combat.42 
 
 35. OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 32, at 35; AFP 110-31, supra note 32, § 
15-2(b) (defining “grave breaches” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions that consti-
tute war crimes, including “willful killing”); FM 27-10, supra note 32, app. A-
118; NAVAL HANDBOOK, supra note 32, § 6.2.6. 
 36. Hors de combat, a French term literally meaning “out of the fight,” re-
fers to soldiers no longer able to take an active part in the hostilities due to 
injury. MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 600 (11th ed. 2003). 
 37. See OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 32, at 28–30; NAVAL HANDBOOK, 
supra note 32, § 6.2.6 (listing examples of war crimes). 
 38. AFP 110-31, supra note 32, § 15-3(c) (listing other war crimes in addi-
tion to grave breaches); FM 27-10, supra note 32, app. A-118 (same). 
 39. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 15 (1946) (describing the purpose of 
the law of war as “protect[ing] civilian populations and prisoners of war from 
brutality”). 
 40. War Crimes Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-192, 110 Stat. 2104 (codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006)). 
 41. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(b)(1)(A), 
120 Stat. 2600, 2633 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(3)); see MICHAEL JOHN 
GARCIA, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: THE WAR CRIMES ACT: CURRENT IS-
SUES, 1–2 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33662.pdf 
(detailing the amendments to the War Crimes Act as a result of Hamdan). The 
War Crimes Act names two other kinds of war crimes: conduct prohibited by 
designated articles of the Annex to the Hague Convention IV and conduct pro-
hibited by the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, 
Booby-Traps, and Other Devices (Protocol II). 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(2), (4). 
 42. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d)(1)(D). In a hearing prior to amending the War 
Crimes Act, the Acting Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal 
Counsel responding to whether murder was a war crime, stated: “If committed 
in circumstances of an armed conflict against a protected person under the 
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The Geneva Conventions, the international touchstone for 
defining violations of the law of war,43 state that the willful 
killing of a protected person constitutes a grave breach.44 Pro-
tected persons are those taking no active part in the hostilities, 
such as civilians, wounded members of armed forces, and medi-
cal and religious personnel.45 The International Criminal Court 
entertains jurisdiction over various murder crimes, which re-
quire that the perpetrator kill a person protected by the Gene-
va Conventions.46 The International Committee of the Red 
Cross, in its comprehensive review of international humanita-
rian law, states that murder is a war crime if the victim is a 
person protected under the Geneva Conventions.47 Customary 
international humanitarian law protects the following people, 
so long as they do not participate in the hostilities: medical per-
sonnel, religious personnel, humanitarian relief personnel, per-
sonnel involved in peacekeeping missions, journalists, and per-
 
laws of war internationally, it can be a war crime, yes.” The Authority to Pros-
ecute Terrorists Under the War Crime Provisions of Title 18: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 14 (2006) (statement of Steven 
Bradbury, Acting Asst. Att’y Gen.). 
 43. See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 31, at 43 (describing the Geneva Conven-
tions as “one of the most significant developments in the law of armed con-
flict”). 
 44. Geneva Convention I, supra note 18, art. 50; Geneva Convention II, 
supra note 18, art. 51; Geneva Convention III, supra note 18, art. 130; Geneva 
Convention IV, supra note 18, art. 147. 
 45. Geneva Convention I, supra note 18, arts. 3, 12, 24; Geneva Conven-
tion II, supra note 18, arts. 3, 12, 30; Geneva Convention III, supra note 18, 
arts. 3, 33; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 18, arts. 3, 16, 20. For a discus-
sion of the appropriate application of the individual Geneva Conventions and 
international law to Guantánamo detainees, see David Weissbrodt & Andrea 
W. Templeton, Fair Trials? The Manual for Military Commissions in Light of 
Common Article 3 and Other International Law, 26 LAW & INEQ. 353, 356–61 
(2008). 
 46. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(a), (c), 
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 94–95, 97; PREPARATORY COMM’N FOR THE 
INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES arts. 8(2)(a)(i), 8(2)(b)(vi), 
8(2)(c)(i)-1, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/prepcomm/report/prepreportdocs.htm (follow “E” 
hyperlink next to “Elements of Crimes”) (listing the elements of the war 
crimes of willful killing, killing a person hors de combat, and murder, respec-
tively). A fourth murder crime is perfidy. PREPARATORY COMM’N FOR THE INT’L 
CRIMINAL COURT, supra, art. 8(2)(b)(xi); see also supra note 32. 
 47. 1 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HU-
MANITARIAN LAW 311 (Jean Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 
2005). 
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sons hors de combat.48 Other scholars reach the same conclu-
sions.49 
Significantly, the U.S. military, federal law, and interna-
tional sources all refer to the Geneva Conventions to state that 
murder only violates the law of war when it is committed 
against protected persons, who broadly include those taking no 
active part in the hostilities. In all of these sources, the offense 
is defined in relation to the victim: if the victim is a protected 
person, then the murderer violates the law of war, regardless of 
the offender’s status. 
C. THE MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS: A NOVEL 
DEFINITION 
Given the unanimous agreement regarding when murder 
violates the law of war, it seems logical that the MCA crime, 
Murder in Violation of the Law of War, would require that 
murder be committed against those taking no active part in the 
hostilities. When the Secretary of Defense enumerated the in-
dividual elements of the crime in the MMC, however, he gave 
an expansive and unprecedented definition for when the law of 
war may be violated.50 
The MMC “provides guidance” with respect to the MCA 
crimes.51 According to the MMC, Murder in Violation of the 
Law of War requires that the killing be unlawful and that the 
killing violate the law of war.52 A comment in the MMC, pur-
porting to explain the element of violating the law of war, 
states that an accused may violate the law of war simply by 
 
 48. Id. at 79, 88, 105, 112, 115, 164. 
 49. See, e.g., HELEN DUFFY, THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ AND THE FRAMEWORK 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 240 (2005); GREEN, supra note 31, at 124–25; Hans-
Peter Gasser, Protection of the Civilian Population, in THE HANDBOOK OF IN-
TERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 237, 256 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008); 
Jann. K. Kleffner, Protection of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra, at 325, 329–30, 
346–49; Nilendra Kumar, Religious Personnel, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra, at 419, 427. 
 50. See 10 U.S.C. § 949a(a) (2006) (enabling the Secretary of Defense to 
define elements of crimes triable by military commissions); MMC, supra note 
11, at IV-11 to -12 (defining the elements of the crime of Murder in Violation of 
the Law of War). 
 51. MMC, supra note 11, at IV-1. 
 52. Id. at IV-12. 
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taking acts as an “unlawful combatant.”53 The MMC provides 
no legal authority to support the comment.54 This definition, 
unlike U.S. military law, U.S. federal law, and customary in-
ternational law, considers only the status of the offender, ra-
ther than the status of the victim as a protected person taking 
no active part in the hostilities.  
II.  (RE)DEFINING THE LAW OF WAR   
The comment in the MMC, by defining a violation of the 
law of war in relation to the status of the accused rather than 
the victim, inverts the established law of war and broadens the 
scope of the offense.55 The redefinition presents more than aca-
demic concern: if judges continue to apply the Secretary of De-
fense’s definition, more detainees could face prosecution for 
Murder in Violation of the Law of War apparently without hav-
ing violated the law of war.56 Since the military commissions 
have multiple procedural shortcuts,57 and since a conviction of 
Murder in Violation of the Law of War can carry the death pe-
nalty,58 it is a matter of fundamental justice that the military 
commission—or any substitute tribunal59—must possess legi-
timate jurisdiction over those charged with this crime. 
This Part first examines the deficiencies in the MMC’s re-
 
 53. Id. (referring to the comment to the crime of intentionally causing se-
rious bodily injury); id. at IV-11 (commenting on the meaning of “acting in vi-
olation of the law of war”). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Compare id. (defining violations of the law of war based on whether 
the accused is a lawful combatant), with Geneva Convention I, supra note 18, 
art. 50 (defining grave breaches as prohibited acts “committed against persons 
or property protected by the Convention”), Geneva Convention II, supra note 
18, art. 51 (same), Geneva Convention III, supra note 18, art. 130 (same), and 
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 18, art. 147 (same). 
 56. The U.S. government has charged multiple detainees with some form 
of Murder in Violation of the Law of War. See U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Military 
Commissions, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/commissions.html (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2009) (follow hyperlinks for individual names to view the charges of 
each) (charging al Bahlul, al Hawsawi, Al-Nashiri, Aziz Ali, Binalshibh, Bin 
‘Attash, Ghailani, Jawad, Khadr, and Mohammed). At least some of these 
charges allege facts similar to Khadr. See id. (listing the charges and specifica-
tions leveled against Khadr and each of the other listed detainees). 
 57. See Weissbrodt & Templeton, supra note 45, at 400 (noting the lack of 
procedural safeguards to guarantee fair trials under the MMC). 
 58. 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(15) (2006). 
 59. See Joby Warrick & Karen DeYoung, Obama Reverses Bush Policies 
on Detention and Interrogation, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2009, at A6 (stating that 
some detainees may be prosecuted in “special national security courts or even 
revised military commissions”). 
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definition. It then analyzes statutory and constitutional bases 
for the MMC’s definition, concluding that the Secretary acted 
without legal authority to redefine the offense. 
A.  AN INVERTED, CONFLATED, AND EXPANSIVE DEFINITION 
The MMC’s definition drastically broadens the scope of 
Murder in Violation of the Law of War by conflating two ele-
ments of the crime.60 The MMC requires as two independent 
elements that the killing be unlawful and that the killing vi-
olate the law of war.61 Killing unlawfully is not the same as vi-
olating the law of war.62 During armed conflict, lawful comba-
tants receive combatant immunity for killing other 
combatants.63 The converse is that an unprivileged bellige-
rent—or an “unlawful enemy combatant” in the MCA’s termi-
nology64—does not receive combatant immunity for killing oth-
er combatants.65 If an unprivileged belligerent commits 
murder, he or she has not de facto violated the law of war, but 
also does not enjoy combatant immunity and may be subject to 
criminal prosecution for murder.66 For this reason, the second 
sentence in the MMC’s comment, which states it is generally 
accepted international practice that unlawful enemy comba-
tants may be prosecuted for offenses such as murder,67 while 
technically correct, is specious. It is true that unprivileged bel-
ligerents can face prosecution, but such a prosecution does not 
alone establish a violation of the law of war or, consequently, 
military commission jurisdiction. 
Indeed, if the government need only prove the combatant 
was unlawful, the crime would be better labeled as Murder by 
an Unprivileged Belligerent, which was a crime in the pre-MCA 
 
 60. MMC, supra note 11, at IV-11 to -12. 
 61. Id. at IV-12. 
 62. See George P. Fletcher, On the Crimes Subject to Prosecution in the 
Military Commissions, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 39, 44 (2007) (“If an unprivileged 
combatant kills someone, it is not clear why the homicide should be regarded 
as violation of the law of war.”). 
 63. See Eric Talbot Jensen, Combatant Status: It Is Time for Intermediate 
Levels of Recognition for Partial Compliance, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 209, 212 (2005). 
 64. 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1) (2006). 
 65. Jensen, supra note 63, at 212–13 (describing combatant status as an 
“all-or-nothing proposition”). 
 66. See Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 367, 437–38 (2004); Audrey Macklin, The Omar Khadr Case: Rede-
fining War Crimes, JURIST, Oct. 31, 2008, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/ 
2008/10/omar-khadr-case-redefining-war-crimes.php. 
 67. See MMC, supra note 11, at IV-11. 
 1882 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1871 
 
version of the military commissions.68 That crime required only 
that the accused commit murder as an “unlawful combatant” 
and did not mention the law of war.69 When Congress passed 
the MCA, it incorporated all but two of the substantive offenses 
in the pre-MCA military commissions, leaving out Murder by 
an Unprivileged Belligerent and Destruction of Property by an 
Unprivileged Belligerent.70 These omissions were likely inten-
tional because Congress recognized that committing acts as an 
“unlawful combatant” does not in and of itself violate the law of 
war.71 
By stating that any action taken by an “unlawful comba-
tant” violates the law of war, the comment in the MMC con-
flates the separate elements of unlawfulness and violating the 
law of war.72 Cogently, in the words of the U.S. Air Force: “‘Un-
lawful combatants’ is a term used to describe only . . . lack of 
standing to engage in hostilities, not whether a violation of the 
law of armed conflict occurred or criminal responsibility ac-
crued.”73  
The charges against Omar Khadr illustrate the point: 
Khadr is accused of killing an active soldier, which—according 
to U.S. military, federal, and international standards—is not a 
protected person.74 Therefore, Khadr’s alleged actions would 
not have violated the law of war, since the victim was not a pro-
tected person. Nonetheless, because Khadr was not a privileged 
combatant, he could have been tried under U.S. criminal law in 
U.S. federal court for murder.75 The MMC’s definition, howev-
 
 68. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION NO. 2, 
§ 6(B)(3) (Apr. 30, 2003), available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/ 
hdocs/docs/dod/milcomm43003inst2.pdf. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Compare id. § 6(B)(3)–(4), with 10 U.S.C. § 950v (2006). 
 71. See Noman Goheer, Comment, The Unilateral Creation of Interna-
tional Law During the “War on Terror”: Murder by an Unprivileged Belligerent 
Is Not a War Crime, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 533, 546 (2007) (“A war crime inhe-
rently requires an overt infraction of the law of war, not just committing a 
domestic crime without combatant immunity.”). 
 72. See Jack M. Beard, The Geneva Boomerang: The Military Commis-
sions Act of 2006 and U.S. Counterterror Operations, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 56, 61 
(2007) (“[A]bsent some other violation, a war crime based solely on the killing 
of a combatant who is engaged in hostilities is problematic under the Geneva 
Conventions.”). 
 73. AFP 110-31, supra note 32, § 3-3. 
 74. See, e.g., Geneva Convention I, supra note 18, arts. 3, 12 (protecting 
only soldiers that have laid down their arms, are hors de combat, or are 
wounded or sick). 
 75. See OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 32, at 17 (“Unprivileged bellige-
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er, by drastically broadening the scope of the offense and, by 
consequence, the commission’s jurisdiction, allows the govern-
ment to try Khadr in a military commission. This result illu-
strates the fundamental difference in the MMC’s approach: by 
defining a violation in terms of the combatant’s status, any ac-
tion taken by an “unlawful combatant” can be held to violate 
the law of war.76  
The accused’s combatant status, however, has no bearing 
on whether the accused killed a protected person. In place of a 
carefully delineated and internationally accepted law of war 
protecting those taking no active part in the hostilities, the 
MMC transforms the expression “violation of the law of war” to 
include those who have killed without combatant immunity, 
which only establishes unlawfulness, not a violation of the law 
of war. 
In defense of the MMC, one could argue that Congress ex-
plicitly addressed protected persons in the MCA’s substantive 
offense of Murder of Protected Persons.77 The MCA defines 
“protected persons” as those protected under the Geneva Con-
ventions.78 In other words, the crime of Murder of Protected 
Persons seems to be the same as the appropriate interpretation 
of Murder in Violation of the Law of War. Nothing appears in 
the legislative history concerning the two substantive offenses, 
leaving the reason for the existence of two separate offenses to 
divination. 
The simplest explanation is that Congress tried to remedy 
the untenable pre-MCA crime of Murder by an Unprivileged 
Belligerent by adding the appropriate jurisdictional hook of a 
violation of the law of war and, at the same time, kept Murder 
of Protected Persons intact between both versions.79 Another 
possible explanation is that because Murder of Protected Per-
 
rents are not entitled to prisoner of war status, and may be prosecuted under 
the domestic law of the captor.”); Macklin, supra note 66. 
 76. As one commentator ironically notes, “Khadr would have the legal sta-
tus of a deer during hunting season—fair game for coalition forces to kill at 
will yet possessing no right to fight back.” David Glazier, A Self-Inflicted 
Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil over the Guantánamo Military Com-
missions, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 131, 186 (2008). 
 77. 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(1) (2006). For a discussion of the differences be-
tween the MCA and the MMC’s definition of this crime, see Geoffrey S. Corn, 
Questioning the Jurisdictional Moorings of the Military Commissions Act, 43 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 29, 36–38 (2007). 
 78. 10 U.S.C. § 950v(a)(2). 
 79. Compare U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 68, § 6(B)(3), with 10 
U.S.C. § 950v. 
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sons does not reference the law of war, Murder in Violation of 
the Law of War could be broader in certain applications, since 
it facially incorporates the entire law of war corpus. For exam-
ple, killing with a prohibited arm violates the law of war,80 but 
the MCA crime Employing Poison or Similar Weapons provides 
a narrower definition for prohibited weapons than the standard 
law of war.81 Therefore, it is possible that a person could kill 
with a weapon, such as projectiles filled with glass, prohibited 
by the law of war but not by the MCA,82 and the U.S. govern-
ment would be able to establish jurisdiction in the military 
commission through Murder in Violation of the Law of War. 
Regardless, the existence of Murder of Protected Persons 
neither affects the legal standards for when murder violates 
the law of war nor remedies the deficiencies in the MMC’s defi-
nition. If anything, it strengthens the established norm that a 
military commission only has jurisdiction over violations of the 
law of war, such as the murder of protected persons. 
B. STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSGRESSIONS 
Given that the MMC redefines when the law of war may be 
violated, the crucial inquiry is whether the Secretary of De-
fense has the statutory or constitutional authority to do so. The 
scope of the Secretary’s authority to redefine when the law of 
war may be violated turns on the location of military commis-
sions in the constitutional system, the specific statutory autho-
rization in the MCA, and a broader separation of powers ques-
tion over who is authorized or qualified to define violations of 
the law of war.83 
1.  Military Commissions in a Tripartite Government 
Military commissions “born of military necessity” are 
strange creatures that lie somewhere between the Constitution 
 
 80. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 
8(2)(b)(xvii)–(xx), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 96. 
 81. Compare 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(8) (defining a prohibited weapon as one 
that kills or produces serious, lasting harm through “asphyxiating, bacterio-
logical, or toxic properties”), with supra note 32 (noting that the standard law 
of war prohibits weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering and those 
that have an indiscriminate effect). 
 82. See FM 27-10, supra note 32, at 17–19. 
 83. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866) (Chase, C.J., 
concurring) (“[N]either can the President, in war more than in peace, intrude 
upon the proper authority of Congress, nor Congress upon the proper authori-
ty of the President.”). 
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and statutory authorization.84 The Supreme Court has never 
decided whether the President has the constitutional power to 
convene military commissions without congressional authoriza-
tion.85 In Hamdan, however, the Court found the lack of “mili-
tary necessity” to be a basic shortcoming to the Executive’s al-
ternative argument that he could establish a military 
commission without congressional authorization.86 Instead, the 
Court required the Executive to seek congressional authoriza-
tion to create a military commission,87 which he received when 
Congress passed the MCA in 2006.88 Therefore, it will primarily 
be a matter of statutory interpretation to ascertain whether the 
Secretary of Defense exceeded his delegated authority when de-
fining the elements of Murder in Violation of the Law of War. 
Nonetheless, because the Secretary of Defense operates 
under the President and exercises authority, direction, and con-
trol over the Department of Defense,89 any contradiction be-
tween the MMC and the MCA also raises fundamental separa-
tion-of-powers issues over which branch of the government is 
constitutionally empowered to define the law of war.90 Guaran-
teeing the appropriate separation of powers is significant: my-
riad are the high Court’s cases that discuss the division of the 
government as fundamental to securing individual liberty.91 
 
 84. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2773 (2006), superseded by 
statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 
(codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), as recognized in 
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241–42 (2008). 
 85. Id. at 2774. 
 86. Id. at 2785 (plurality opinion). 
 87. Id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Nothing prevents the President 
from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.”). 
 88. See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text. 
 89. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Top Civilian and Military Leaders, http://www 
.defenselink.mil/home/top-leaders (last visited Apr. 15, 2009). 
 90. See Corn, supra note 77, at 38 (asking, but not answering: “[W]hat 
branch of our government is best suited to decide which crimes are heard by 
the military commission?”). 
 91. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2246 (2008); Loving v. Unit-
ed States, 517 U.S. 748, 756 (1996); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 269 
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The accumulation of all powers, 
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be pro-
nounced the very definition of tyranny.”). 
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2.  Congress’s Expressed Intent Precludes the Secretary of 
Defense from Redefining the Law of War 
The Constitution sets forth the war powers of the legisla-
tive and executive branches in broad terms,92 but more often, 
“the question of presidential power in the context of war and 
terrorism is one of statutory interpretation.”93 Recognizing that 
the Guantánamo military commissions are statutory crea-
tions,94 Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer provides the appropriate frame-
work for interpreting the validity of executive action, particu-
larly in the context of war.95 The tripartite framework divides 
executive action into three zones—with congressional authori-
zation, in the absence of congressional action, and contrary to 
the will of Congress—to determine how much deference the 
Court should grant the Executive’s action.96 In the first zone, 
the President’s authority is at its maximum and supported by 
the strongest presumption of validity.97 The second zone of 
Jackson’s framework is inapplicable, since Congress acted by 
passing the MCA.98 In the third zone, courts can sustain execu-
tive action only if it is beyond the scope of all congressional 
power.99 Such executive claims, however, must be closely scru-
tinized, as the “equilibrium” of the “constitutional system” is at 
stake.100 
While it appears that the Secretary of Defense acted with 
congressional authorization because he promulgated the MMC 
 
 92. Congress’s war powers are found in Article I, § 8. U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8. The executive’s constitutional war power is to “be the Commander in Chief 
of the Army and Navy.” Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 93. Neil Kinkopf, The Statutory Commander in Chief, 81 IND. L.J. 1169, 
1169 (2006); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional 
Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2133 (2005) 
(“[I]t is essential to determine what Congress has, and has not, authorized.”). 
 94. See 10 U.S.C. § 948b(b) (2006). 
 95. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in 
Youngstown’s Shadows, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 87, 107 (2002); see also Harold 
Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright Comes Home: Executive Power 
and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349, 351–52 (1986). 
 96. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–38. 
 97. Id. at 635–37. 
 98. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 
2600 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.); Youngstown, 
343 U.S. at 637. 
 99. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637–38. 
 100. Id. at 638. 
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pursuant to the MCA, Congress required that the elements of 
proof not be contrary to or inconsistent with the MCA,101 and 
therefore, by redefining when the law of war may be violated, 
the Secretary of Defense acted contrary to the expressed will of 
Congress. 
Congress only authorized the Secretary of Defense to enact 
elements of proof that would be consistent with the MCA.102 
The MCA declares that it does not establish new offenses, and 
only purports to codify previously existing crimes.103 If the 
MCA had created new crimes, detainees could only be tried for 
offenses occurring after the passage of the MCA, something 
that Congress explicitly avoided.104 While there is substantial 
skepticism that Congress did not create new crimes in the 
MCA,105 as a matter of statutory interpretation, the Secretary 
of Defense was not authorized to act contrary to the explicit 
will of Congress by creating a new crime.106 Altering when the 
law of war may be violated redefines the crime of Murder in Vi-
olation of the Law of War. 
Another canon of statutory interpretation, known as the 
Charming Betsy doctrine, weighs against allowing the Secre-
tary of Defense to craft a new definition for when the law of 
war may be violated. In Murray v. Charming Betsy, the Court 
declared that an act of Congress should never be construed to 
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction re-
mains.107 Since the law of war is defined by looking to interna-
tional practice,108 interpreting the MCA to allow the Secretary 
of Defense to redefine the law of war unilaterally would be 
choosing a construction of the MCA that would defy the inter-
national definition and application of the law of war. Instead, it 
would be reasonable to interpret the MCA as conforming to the 
 
 101. 10 U.S.C. § 949a(a) (2006). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. § 950p. 
 104. Id. § 950p(b) (stating the offenses are declarative of existing law and 
“do not preclude trial for crimes that occurred before the date” of enactment). 
 105. See Weissbrodt & Templeton, supra note 45, at 364 (“[T]he MCA adds 
new crimes to those previously known in international law.”); see also Gabor 
Rona, Legal Issues in the “War on Terrorism”—Reflecting on the Conversation 
Between Silja N.U. Voneky and John Bellinger, 9 GERMAN L.J. 711, 731 (2008) 
(same). 
 106. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 949a(a), 950p. 
 107. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
 108. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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international law of war by not creating a new offense for when 
murder violates the law of war. 
Additionally, Congress does not “hide elephants in mouse-
holes.”109 Congress mentions “law of war” no less than nineteen 
times in the MCA, but never defines the expression.110 If Con-
gress meant the “law of war” to mean anything other than the 
traditional expression, or if Congress wanted the Secretary of 
Defense to interpret or define the law of war, it easily could 
have so stated.111 As a matter of statutory interpretation, the 
Secretary of Defense acted contrary to Congress’s express will 
and, consequently, without statutory authorization.112 
This reasoning places the Secretary of Defense’s actions in-
to the third zone of the Jackson framework, where the execu-
tive branch’s constitutional powers only pass muster if they are 
beyond the reach of Congress’s constitutional powers.113 In oth-
er words, even though the Secretary of Defense acted contrary 
to congressional authorization, the MMC’s definition is valid if 
the Secretary possessed the constitutional power to redefine 
the offense. 
3.  The Constitutional Separation of Powers 
The Secretary of Defense’s action raises three distinct con-
stitutional inquiries. First, since defining when murder violates 
the law of war was an act of a legislative nature,114 could Con-
gress have delegated such law-making authority to the Execu-
tive? Second, even if Congress could not delegate such authori-
ty, are the Executive and the Secretary of Defense 
constitutionally empowered to make such decisions? Third, if 
 
 109. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). 
 110. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 
2600 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 111. See, e.g., Burgess v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1572, 1578 (2008) (stat-
ing if Congress wanted “felony drug offense” to incorporate the definition of 
felony, it “easily could have” written the statute to say so); Idaho v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 262, 277 (2001) (“Congress was free to define the reservation 
boundaries however it saw fit.”). 
 112. Another commentator, considering the separate offense of Murder of 
Protected Persons, reaches the same conclusion. See Corn, supra note 77, at 38 
(“There is no authority in the MCA for the Department of Defense to redefine 
and lessen the proof requirements of the statute.”). 
 113. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
 114. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 399, 919 (8th ed. 2004) (defining crime 
as “[a]n act that the law makes punishable,” and legislative as “[o]f or relating 
to lawmaking”). 
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not, do concerns of national security and terrorism allow the re-
laxation of constitutional safeguards in order for the executive 
branch to act effectively? 
a.  The Nondelegation Doctrine Prohibits Congress from 
Delegating Authority to Define the Law of War 
In areas of delegation, the constitutional separation of 
powers between Congress and the Executive is not firmly 
moored.115 As an outer boundary, Congress cannot constitu-
tionally delegate its legislative powers to another branch under 
the nondelegation doctrine.116 Congress may, however, delegate 
authority to the executive branch to secure the effect intended 
by the legislation, so long as Congress creates “an intelligible 
principle” to which the person or body authorized to execute the 
delegated authority is directed to conform.117 The Supreme 
Court declined to answer whether a higher standard applies 
when Congress delegates the authority to define criminal con-
duct.118 The nondelegation doctrine, although still good law,119 
has proven largely theoretical in practice because courts are re-
luctant to invalidate legislation.120 Courts have upheld dele-
 
 115. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406, 
409 (1928) (“[T]he extent and character . . . [of permissible delegation] must be 
fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the govern-
mental co-ordination.”). 
 116. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That Congress cannot 
delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally recog-
nized as vital . . . .”). 
 117. J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409; see also Interstate Commerce Comm’n 
v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194, 214 (1912) (“The Congress may not del-
egate its purely legislative power to a commission, but, having laid down the 
general rules of action under which a commission shall proceed, it may require 
of that commission the application of such rules to particular situations and 
the investigation of facts, with a view to making orders in a particular matter 
within the rules laid down by Congress.”). 
 118. See Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165–66 (1991). But see 
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (“[B]ecause of the seriousness 
of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the 
moral condemnation of the community, legislatures . . . should define criminal 
activity.”). 
 119. See Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685–88 
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (contending that the Court should apply the 
nondelegation doctrine to invalidate a legislative provision). 
 120. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372–73 (1989) (stating 
that the doctrine has “been driven by a practical understanding” and noting 
that no statute has been found unconstitutional for delegating too much au-
thority since 1935). 
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gated authority to define crimes provided adequate notice ex-
ists for the defendant.121 
In the MCA, Congress only delegated to the Secretary of 
Defense the ability to define procedures and rules consistent 
with the MCA.122 This delegation does not violate the nondele-
gation doctrine because the legislation provides an intelligible 
principle: to define procedures and rules not contrary to or in-
consistent with the legislation.123 Rather, this delegation rea-
sonably recognized the Department of Defense’s expertise for 
defining procedures related to such delicate matters as treat-
ment of confidential information.124 
Interpreting the delegated authority to allow the Secretary 
of Defense to craft new definitions of when the law of war may 
be violated, however, rapidly approaches the boundaries of 
permissible constitutional delegation. First, it is not clear that 
Congress even has the power to redefine the law of war.125 In 
United States v. Schultz, the Court of Military Appeals held 
that negligent vehicular homicide was not a cognizable crime 
under the law of war.126 Relying on Ex parte Quirin, the court 
looked to “customs and usages of civilized nations” and whether 
Congress had “codified” or “defined” universally accepted viola-
tions of the law of war.127 This language, alongside the consti-
tutional power to “define offenses against the law of nations,”128 
suggests that Congress can only codify existing offenses against 
the law of war, not create new or redefine existing ones. If Con-
 
 121. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996); David M. Drie-
sen, Loose Canons: Statutory Construction and the New Nondelegation Doc-
trine, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 26 n.175 (2002). But see B.H. v. State, 645 So. 2d 
987, 991–92 (Fla. 1994) (criticizing the federal courts’ failure to read the Con-
stitution textually and prevent Congress from delegating authority to define 
crimes). 
 122. 10 U.S.C. § 949a(a) (2006). 
 123. Id. But see Gregory S. McNeal, Beyond Guantánamo, Obstacles and 
Options, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 29, 40 (2008) (noting that the broad delegations in 
the MCA to the Secretary of Defense are problematic). 
 124. 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b). 
 125. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 13 (1946) (stating congressional ac-
tion could not authorize trial in a military commission unless the charge was a 
violation of the law of war); George P. Fletcher, The Law of War and its Pa-
thologies, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 517, 546 (2007) (describing the consti-
tutional interpretation of Hamdan as holding the law of war is incorporated 
into the constitutional structure and “cannot be redefined by a simple law of 
Congress”). 
 126. United States v. Schultz, 1 C.M.A. 512, 522–23 (C.M.A. 1952). 
 127. Id. 
 128. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 10 (emphasis added). 
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gress cannot redefine the law of war, it cannot delegate a power 
that it lacks.129 
Even if Congress has the power to redefine the law of war, 
it is Congress, not the Executive, which has the constitutional 
power to define offenses against the law of nations, including 
the law of war.130 The Constitution separates this congressional 
power from domestic lawmaking.131 While the “present-day fed-
eral conception of administrative involvement in defining 
crimes remains rife with unresolved tensions,”132 the ability to 
define offenses against the law of nations implicates a separate 
constitutional congressional power, which the Supreme Court 
indicated cannot be exercised by the Executive.133 
Additionally, permitting the Secretary of Defense to define 
violations of the law of war raises issues of notice. The Supreme 
Court allowed Congress to delegate crime definition provided 
adequate notice exists for the defendant, as required by the 
Constitution.134 Allowing the Secretary of Defense to redefine 
the law of war for jurisdiction in a military commission de-
signed to try detainees for acts committed prior to the legisla-
tion contravenes basic norms of notice: before the MMC, there 
was no basis to believe that murder would violate the law of 
war based on the offender’s, rather than the victim’s, status.135 
Furthermore, at least theoretically, by limiting the author-
ity Congress may delegate, the nondelegation doctrine may also 
intrinsically limit the authority the executive branch can exer-
cise.136 Logically, if Congress lacked the constitutional authori-
 
 129. See, e.g., Rebecca Hanner White, Deference and Disability Discrimina-
tion, 99 MICH. L. REV. 532, 573–74 (2000) (“[I]f Congress itself lacks that in-
terpretive power, then Congress cannot delegate that power to an administra-
tive agency.”). 
 130. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 10; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 
2749, 2779–80 (2006) (plurality opinion), superseded by statute, Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), as recognized in Boumediene v. 
Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241–42 (2008); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942). 
 131. Compare U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 10 (“To define . . . Offences against 
the Law of Nations”), with id. cl. 1 (the Spending Clause), and id. cl. 3 (the 
Commerce Clause). 
 132. B.H. v. State, 645 So. 2d 987, 991 (Fla. 1994). 
 133. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2779–80. 
 134. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996). 
 135. See Stephen I. Vladeck, On Jurisdictional Elephants and Kangaroo 
Courts, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 172, 180 (2008) (stating it is an ex post facto viola-
tion to “subject a defendant to trial for a violation of the law of war that was 
not a violation of the law of war at the time the unlawful conduct took place”). 
 136. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 
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ty to delegate the definition of the law of war, then that author-
ity rests solely with Congress and the Secretary of Defense con-
stitutionally cannot define the law of war, regardless of what 
the statute says. 
Reading the MCA to delegate to the Secretary of Defense 
the ability to define violations of the law of war approaches and 
likely encroaches on the constitutional limits of congressional 
delegation. Such an interpretation indicates that the MCA is 
unconstitutional for impermissibly delegating Congress’s con-
stitutional powers. After all, it is Congress—not the Secretary 
of Defense—that is constitutionally empowered to define of-
fenses against the law of nations. Instead, reading the MCA to 
not delegate the ability to define the law of war upholds clear 
constitutional roles and eschews constitutional uncertainty. 
b.  The Executive Lacks Inherent Constitutional Powers to 
Define the Law of War 
Even if statutes and congressional delegation preclude the 
Secretary of Defense from redefining the law of war, the execu-
tive branch might argue that its inherent constitutional war-
time powers extend beyond the reach of Congress. The Su-
preme Court formally invokes deference to the political 
branches in war137 and national security matters,138 but the 
 
317–18 (2000) (“The most convincing claim on behalf of the conventional [non-
delegation] doctrine is . . . that certain highly sensitive decisions should be 
made by Congress . . . .”); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Con-
stitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 446 (2007) (stating the result of the largely tooth-
less nondelegation doctrine has nonetheless “not been unlimited discretion for 
agencies”). But see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) 
(emphasizing that the nondelegation doctrine acts solely as a limit on Con-
gress). 
 137. There is considerable skepticism that the “war on terror” constitutes 
an actual war. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 
YALE L.J. 1029, 1034 (2004) (“[T]he ‘war on terrorism’ is merely a metaphor 
without decisive legal significance, more like the ‘war on drugs’ or the ‘war on 
crime’ . . . .”); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 958 (2002) (“We 
are fighting an international criminal organization . . . . But we have declared 
war on no nation.”); Adam Roberts, The “War on Terror” in Historical Perspec-
tive, 47 SURVIVAL 101, 125 (2005) (arguing a better description would be “in-
ternational campaign against terrorism”). Nonetheless, recent Supreme Court 
cases demonstrate a concern for national security and recognition of some 
form of conflict. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008); Ham-
dan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2798 (2006) (referring to “active hostilities”), 
superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 
120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), as 
recognized in Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241–42. 
 138. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2276. 
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specific constitutional boundaries between the executive and 
legislative branches are far from clear.139 At one end, the Bush 
Administration argued for strong, inherent constitutional war 
powers beyond the control of Congress.140 At the other end, the 
concept of an Executive wielding “virtually unlimited powers,” 
has been repeatedly rebuked as fundamentally at odds with the 
constitutional separation of powers.141 Nonetheless, the Su-
preme Court refrains from drawing clear lines around the Ex-
ecutive’s constitutional wartime powers.142 
There are several arguments that defeat a claim of inhe-
rent executive power to define the law of war. First, Congress 
has the explicit constitutional power to define offenses against 
the law of nations.143 In contrast, the Commander-in-Chief 
power solely grants the President the ability to command and 
direct the armed forces.144 This explicit congressional power 
makes claims of inherent executive power to define when the 
law of war may be violated difficult to substantiate.145 Even if 
one were to claim that somehow the executive branch may re-
define the law of war, it is “well-established” that some of the 
President’s substantive constitutional powers are permissible 
 
 139. See Kinkopf, supra note 93, at 1169; Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative 
Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663, 2672 (2005); Mark Tushnet, Con-
trolling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2673, 
2675 (2005). 
 140. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Asst. Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Jus-
tice, to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President 37–39 (Aug. 1, 2002), [he-
reinafter Torture Memo], available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf (arguing that the 
President has “an unenumerated ‘executive power,’” and that Congress cannot 
regulate “the Constitution’s sole vesting of the Commander-in-Chief authority 
in the President”). 
 141. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661–62 (1981); see also Ham-
dan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Congress has not issued the 
Executive a ‘blank check.’”). 
 142. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2277 (“Our opinion does not undermine 
the Executive’s powers as Commander in Chief.”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Presidential 
powers are not fixed but fluctuate . . . .”). 
 143. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 144. See, e.g., Elizabeth L. Hillman, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Commander in 
Chief, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1037, 1041 (2008) (noting that Alexander Hamilton 
deprecated the commander-in-chief power). 
 145. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942) (stating the President has 
the power to carry into effect all laws passed by Congress “defining and pu-
nishing offences against the law of nations, including those which pertain to 
the conduct of war”). 
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only until superseded by statute.146 If the executive branch 
were to possess some inherent constitutional power to define 
violations of the law of war, such a power would be “provision-
al”147 and would have been superseded by passage of the MCA. 
Second, the Supreme Court already indicated that Con-
gress has the power to define the jurisdiction and procedures of 
military commissions.148 Subject matter jurisdiction in a mili-
tary commission revolves around the nature of the offense,149 so 
defining the offense is an essential component of defining juris-
diction. Stating that the executive branch has the constitution-
al authority to define jurisdiction over military commissions by 
defining the predicate substantive offenses would ignore one of 
the central pillars of Hamdan: in the realm of military commis-
sions, the Executive only exercises authority subordinate to 
Congress.150  
Third, the Secretary of Defense is not the President. The 
Executive’s constitutional power is to be the Commander in 
Chief.151 Claims for expansive executive power center on the 
President as an individual, who acts with purpose and energy 
as the military commander of the nation’s forces.152 While the 
Secretary of Defense certainly plays an important role as the 
principal defense policy advisor to the President,153 claims of 
strong constitutional executive power lose relevance when ap-
plied to a subordinate acting within, not leading, the executive 
branch.154 
 
 146. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at 
the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 
121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 742 (2008); see also id. at 742–43 n.167 (citing exam-
ples of commander-in-chief powers superseded by statute). 
 147. Id. at 742. 
 148. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2804 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring), superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 
No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 
U.S.C.), as recognized in Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241–42 
(2008). 
 149. See cases cited supra note 23. 
 150. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774–75 (noting the lack of congressional 
authorization for military commissions); id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(adding that the Executive must seek congressional authorization to create 
military commissions); id. at 2808 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that Con-
gress, not the Executive, prescribes the limits for military commissions). 
 151. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 152. See Torture Memo, supra note 140, at 37. 
 153. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, supra note 89. 
 154. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 146, at 696–97 (stating that the 
President must retain control over military discretion in armed conflict and 
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The argument that the executive branch possesses some 
form of inherent power to redefine the law of war is constitu-
tionally bankrupt. Without the constitutional power to define 
the law of war, the Secretary of Defense can only claim that 
given the potential devastation of terrorist attacks, national se-
curity concerns mandate loosening constitutional formalities. 
c.  No Emergency Necessitates Relaxing Constitutional 
Safeguards 
As a final defense to redefining the law of war, the execu-
tive branch could claim that somewhat apart from constitu-
tional boundaries, it alone is best qualified to address issues of 
national security and terrorism, and that defining when and 
how detained persons should be tried is a necessary component 
of that power.155 This argument, however, is a variant on the 
one rejected in Hamdan, where the Court decided that no 
emergency prevented the executive branch from consulting 
with Congress.156 Moreover, in Boumediene v. Bush, the Court 
again rebuked similar claims of exigency in the face of potential 
terrorist attacks, stating that the political branches could en-
gage in a “genuine debate” about how to preserve constitutional 
values while protecting the country from terrorism.157 In 
Youngstown, during a national emergency, the Court rejected 
unilateral executive action.158 
Both Hamdan, which rejected the constitutional ability of 
the Executive to convoke military commissions in the absence 
of an emergency, and Boumediene, which prohibited the Execu-
tive and Congress from suspending habeas corpus for detai-
 
that “Congress may not assign such ultimate decisionmaking discretion to an-
yone else (including subordinate military officers)”). 
 155. Cf. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: 
SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 16 (2007) (“The reason for relaxing con-
stitutional norms during emergencies is that the risks to civil liberties inhe-
rent in expansive executive power . . . are justified by the national security 
benefits.”). 
 156. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2799 (2006) (Breyer, J., 
concurring), superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 
No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 
U.S.C.), as recognized in Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241–42 
(2008). In Justice Kennedy’s observation: “The Constitution is best preserved 
by reliance on standards tested over time and insulated from the pressures of 
the moment. These principles seem vindicated here, for a case that may be of 
extraordinary importance is resolved by ordinary rules.” Id. (Kennedy, J., con-
curring in part). 
 157. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2277. 
 158. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588–89 (1952). 
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nees, considered broad legal questions addressing terrorism.159 
The definition of a crime within a military commission, in con-
trast, presents a subsidiary legal question in the larger ap-
proach to countering terrorism and protecting national securi-
ty. Therefore, the logic of both cases should extend to denying 
the Secretary of Defense the ability to redefine when murder 
violates the law of war. In the absence of a national emergency, 
the Executive simply has no claim on arrogating congressional 
powers.160 General concerns of national security do not override 
constitutional safeguards.161 
Additionally, Congress already passed the MCA, which 
creates a tribunal system specifically tailored to prosecuting 
detainees in the context of terrorism and national security.162 
The existence of this legislation further derails any claim that 
the executive branch needs to act beyond or contrary to con-
gressional authorization in the face of national security. The 
Executive received statutory authorization to prosecute indi-
viduals in a system specifically designed to meet policy con-
cerns in the “war on terror.” 
Congress fulfilled its constitutional role by defining of-
fenses against the law of nations, and the executive branch is 
left to implement the law, not redefine it. The executive branch 
possesses no constitutional power to amend or contravene Con-
gress in the realm of defining the law of war. 
III.  ENSURING FAIR PROSECUTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS 
OF THE LAW OF WAR   
Because the Secretary of Defense conclusively lacked sta-
tutory or constitutional authority to redefine Murder in Viola-
tion of the Law of War, those accused of the crime should only 
be convicted if the government proves every element of the of-
fense, including that the accused violated the law of war. Al-
though President Obama has announced that Guantánamo will 
 
 159. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2274–75; Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2798. 
 160. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also 
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587 (holding that even during a national emergency, 
“the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the 
idea that he is to be a lawmaker”). 
 161. See Stephen Reinhardt, Weakening the Bill of Rights: A Victory for 
Terrorism, 106 MICH. L. REV. 963, 968 (2008) (stating that deference to the 
executive does not mean abdication of constitutional protections). 
 162. See James Nicholas Boeving, The Right to Be Present Before Military 
Commissions and Federal Courts: Protecting National Security in an Age of 
Classified Information, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 463, 570–71 (2007). 
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be closed within the first year of his presidency,163 the debate 
over closing Guantánamo has focused largely on placing the de-
tainees in detention facilities and tribunal systems.164 An im-
portant and overlooked question concerns the substantive of-
fenses available for prosecution. Will future prosecutions 
transfer wholesale the offenses and their elements from the 
MCA and MMC? Will prosecutors instead utilize existing fed-
eral crimes? Will Congress enact modified MCA crimes? 
If former detainees are charged with some form of Murder 
in Violation of the Law of War, judges present before such 
prosecutions will have the duty to ensure an actual violation of 
the law of war occurred. Yet the MMC’s problematic definition 
also presents larger issues concerning the rule of law that the 
Obama Administration must heed. Before employing or borrow-
ing from the MCA and MMC, the new administration must 
carefully scrutinize executive interpretations of MCA crimes 
and ensure that prosecutions of former Guantánamo detainees 
abide by the Constitution and the law of war. 
A.  JUDGES SHOULD APPLY THE (ACTUAL) LAW OF WAR 
The first and most direct remedy to the MMC’s statutory 
and constitutional inadequacies involves the judiciary. If some 
form of MCA substantive offenses and MMC procedural rules 
are transferred to future prosecutions, the former military 
commissions illustrate the importance of the judge’s role: it will 
fall on the judge in the first instance to appropriately interpret 
when the law of war may be violated by disregarding the 
MMC’s comment as deficient in any legal basis and contrary to 
express congressional intent. The MMC only purports to “pro-
vide[] guidance,”165 and judges would not overstep their judicial 
authority by declining to apply the MMC’s definition. 
Instead, judges presiding over prosecutions for Murder in 
Violation of the Law of War must require juries to find as an 
independent element that the accused violated the law of 
war.166 The MMC itself requires that for each offense, the in-
structions on findings must contain a description of the indi-
 
 163. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
 164. See Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Where Will Guantánamo Detainees 
Go?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2009, at A13 (explaining that finding a prison will-
ing and able to accommodate detainees will be difficult). 
 165. MMC, supra note 11, at IV-1. 
 166. Id. at IV-12. 
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vidual elements,167 and the government bears the burden of 
proving “beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of each subs-
tantive offense charged.”168 Accordingly, judges should present 
juries with a specific findings instruction that the alleged kill-
ing violated the law of war. To find that the accused violated 
the law of war, the judge must ask the jury to consider the sta-
tus of the victim and not whether the combatant was lawful or 
not. The jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the vic-
tim was a protected person, one who was taking no active part 
in the hostilities.169 
Should judges fail to apply the correct definition of when 
murder violates the law of war, the lawyers defending those ac-
cused of the crime will likely appeal. The Secretary of Defense’s 
interpretation will be difficult to uphold, as the MMC contains 
no citations to legal authority and the great weight of existing 
law-of-war interpretations indicate that the MMC’s definition 
is incorrect. While an appellate court should overturn any ap-
plication of the Secretary of Defense’s definition, the conse-
quence would be another trial with appropriate jury instruc-
tions. Those instructions would require the jury to find as two 
independent elements that the killing was unlawful (i.e., com-
mitted without combatant immunity) and that the killing vi-
olated the law of war (i.e., committed against a protected per-
son). Since trials of detainees are already cumbersome due to 
evidentiary and procedural difficulties,170 and since many de-
tainees from Guantánamo already have been held upwards of 
six years,171 as a matter of fairness and systemic efficiency, it 
would be preferable for the judge to get it right the first time. 
 
 167. Id. at II-114 to -115. The Rules for Military Commissions, contained 
within the MMC, provide the procedural rules for the military commissions. 
Id. at I-3; U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, RULES FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS § 101 
(2007). 
 168. MMC, supra note 11, at II-14; U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 167, 
§ 202. 
 169. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d)(1)(D) (2006); Geneva Convention I, supra note 
18, arts. 3, 12, 24; NAVAL HANDBOOK, supra note 32, § 6.2.6. 
 170. See William Glaberson & Eric Lichtblau, Guantánamo Detainee’s Tri-
al Opens, Ending a Seven-Year Legal Tangle, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2008, at 
A12. 
 171. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008). 
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B.  THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION MUST ENSURE FUTURE 
PROSECUTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW OF WAR ARE 
CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND 
More fundamentally, however, there is something disturb-
ing in the MMC’s redefinition of when murder violates the law 
of war. Surely it is a reasonable presumption that Secretary of 
Defense Gates was familiar with U.S. military law, federal law, 
and the law of war when he promulgated the MMC. Why then 
does the MMC attempt to define Murder in Violation of the 
Law of War in a manner contrary to all three? 
Without delving into subjective intent, the objective effect 
of the MMC’s redefinition is a drastic expansion of substantive 
jurisdiction for the military commissions. While the law of war 
serves the purpose of protecting civilians and soldiers hors de 
combat,172 by focusing on the accused’s status rather than the 
victim’s, the MMC twists the law of war to serve a prosecutorial 
function.173 According to the MMC, the U.S. government needs 
to prove only that the accused acted unlawfully and gets a free 
pass on proving a violation of the law of war.174 Yet such an ap-
proach ignores the corpus of military commission jurispru-
dence: violating the law of war is the essential predicate for es-
tablishing substantive jurisdiction.175 Deliberately redefining 
the law of war to facilitate jurisdiction and convictions over de-
tainees like Omar Khadr, who have not violated the law of war, 
offends basic notions of fairness and justice. Even the Executive 
is bound to comply with the rule of law.176 
As the Obama Administration moves forward with prose-
cutions of former Guantánamo detainees, regardless of where 
they occur, it must be mindful that only Congress can define or 
codify violations of the law of war. Whether in Guantánamo, 
federal court, or some variation of the two,177 Congress cannot 
delegate to the Secretary of Defense the authority to invent 
new ways to violate the law of war in order to facilitate convic-
 
 172. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 15 (1946). 
 173. See Macklin, supra note 66 (illustrating the “heads I win; tails you 
lose” quality of the prosecution’s interpretation of the law of war). 
 174. See MMC, supra note 11, at IV-11. 
 175. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2777 (2006), superseded by 
statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 
(codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), as recognized in 
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241–42; In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 13; Ex parte 
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29 (1942). 
 176. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2798. 
 177. See Warrick & DeYoung, supra note 59. 
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tions of detainees. Further, if the administration transposes 
substantive offenses from the MCA to other tribunals, it must 
scrutinize each one to determine whether the Secretary of De-
fense has attempted to modify, expand, or—in the case of Mur-
der in Violation of the Law of War—completely invert the law 
of war.178 
President Obama also should issue an executive order reaf-
firming the government’s commitment to abiding by the law of 
war. His first two executive orders related to Guantánamo de-
tainees invoke the Geneva Conventions as providing a mini-
mum baseline for U.S. activity.179 An additional executive order 
should affirm—as federal law and the U.S. military already 
do180—the Geneva Conventions as the starting point for deter-
mining violations of the law of war for any relevant substantive 
offense. Such an order would prohibit “creative” interpretations 
of the law of war within the executive branch, thereby creating 
an additional check on the constitutionality of law-of-war pros-
ecutions. 
If the Obama Administration were to simply transfer the 
substantive offenses and their corresponding elements from the 
MCA and MMC to prosecutions of former Guantánamo detai-
nees and future defendants accused of terrorist acts, it would 
continue to grant the prosecutors a free pass on proving an es-
sential element of the crime. Inside or outside of a military 
commission, if the charge alleges a violation of the law of war, 
the government must prove that such a violation occurred. Al-
lowing the executive branch to redefine violations of the law of 
war in order to cast a large net of potentially lethal criminal 
liability around detainees violates fundamental constitutional 
barriers separating the powers of the government. 
  CONCLUSION   
When the Secretary of Defense, pursuant to the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, promulgated the elements of the 
crime of Murder in Violation of the Law of War, he included a 
comment that taking acts as an “unlawful combatant” in and of 
itself violates the law of war. By focusing on the status of the 
offender rather than the victim, this definition of Murder in Vi-
 
 178. See Corn, supra note 77, at 38 (finding that the MMC lessens proof 
requirements for the offense of Murder of Protected Persons). 
 179. See Exec. Order No. 13,492 § 3, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009); Ex-
ec. Order No. 13,491 § 6, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
 180. See supra notes 35, 40–41 and accompanying text. 
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olation of the Law of War is irreconcilable with the widely es-
tablished standard that murder only violates the law of war 
when committed against a protected person, who is someone 
taking no active part in the hostilities. This definition imper-
missibly expands the limited jurisdiction of the military com-
missions to allow prosecution of those who have not violated 
any law of war, such as Omar Khadr, the then-fifteen-year old 
charged with throwing a grenade at a U.S. soldier while under 
attack. The Secretary of Defense lacked both statutory and con-
stitutional authority to redefine when the law of war may be 
violated. 
Judges presiding over prosecutions for Murder in Violation 
of the Law of War should disregard the Secretary’s definition 
and require that juries find an actual violation of the law of 
war. The Obama Administration, in future law-of-war prosecu-
tions, must not transpose the substantive offenses of the MCA 
without carefully scrutinizing the Secretary of Defense’s inter-
pretations of those crimes. To do otherwise would violate the 
constitutional separation of powers, disregard the law of war, 
and pave the way for easier and unfair convictions for crimes 
that carry the death penalty. 
